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TITLE 76
CRIMINAL CODE
Repeals and Reenactments. - Former Title 76, Chapters 1 to 66, the Penal Code, was
repealed by Laws 1973, ch. 196, § 76-10-1401, effective July 1, 1973. Present Title 76, the Utah
Criminal Code, was enacted by§§ 76-10-101 to 76-10-1306 of the act.

Chapter
1. General Provisions.
2. Principles of Criminal Responsibility.
3. Punishments.
4. Inchoate Offenses.
5. Offenses Against the Person.
5a. Sexual Exploitation of Children.
6. Offenses Against Property.
6a. Pyramid Schemes.
7. Offenses Against the Family.
8. Offenses Against the Administration of Government.
9. Offenses Against Public Order and Decency.
10. Offenses Against Public Health, Safety, Welfare and Morals.
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PARTl
INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS
76-1-101.

Short title.

This title shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Criminal Code."
History: C. 1953, 76-1-101, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-101.
Cross-References. - State Commission on

76-1-102.

Criminal and Juvenile Justice,
seq.

§

63-25-1 et

Effective date.

This code shall become effective on July 1, 1973.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-102, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-102.

76-1-103. Application of code - Offense prior to effective
date.
(1) The provisions of this code shall govern the construction of, the punishment for, and defenses against any offense defined in this code or, except where
otherwise specifically provided or the context otherwise requires, any offense
defined outside this code; provided such offense was committed after the
effective date of this code.
(2) Any offense committed prior to the effective date of this code shall be
governed by the law, statutory and non-statutory, existing at the time of
commission thereof, except that a defense or limitation on punishment
available under this code shall be available to any defendant tried or retried
after the effective date. An offense under the laws of this state shall be deemed
to have been committed prior to the effective date of this act if any of the
elements of the offense occurred prior thereto.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-103, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-103.

2

GENERAL PROVISIONS

76-1-104

NOTES TO DECISIONS
accused entitled to benefit oflesser punishment
if penalty for offense is reduced before imposition of sentence; therefore, one convicted of
passing check without sufficient funds in violation of former Section 76-20-11 was entitled to
be sentenced under less severe provisions of
Section 76-6-505 of the new Criminal Code.
State v. Saxton, 30 Utah 2d 456,519 P.2d 1340
(1974).
In sentencing defendant who had pled guilty
to sodomy under former Section 76-53-22, trial
judge was not required to take into account
reduced penalty for the crime under new statute, since it divided former offense into crimes
of"sodomy" and "forcible sodomy," so that technically the penalty for the crime of which defendant was convicted was not reduced, and
because trial judge did take change in law into
account and' held hearing to determine which
provision of new code applied to defendant's
act, defendant could not complain of entry of
sentence under "forcible sodomy" provisions.
State v. Atkinson, 532 P.2d 215 (Utah 1975).

ANALYSIS

Offense defined outside Criminal Code.
Sentencing.
-After effective date of Code.
Under statute subsequently amended.

Offense defined outside Criminal Code.
The Controlled Substances Act expressly and
specificallyestablishes the offense of arranging
for the distribution of a controlled substance;
therefore, pursuant to former § 58-37-19 and
this section, defendant was required to be
charged with that offense under § 58-37S(l)(a)(iv) of the Controlled Substances Act,
and it was error to charge him under § 76-2202 of the Criminal Code. State v. Hicken, 659
P.2d 1038 (Utah 1983).
A person cannot be charged with aiding and
abetting another when he or she haqdles the
negotiations and price of a controlled substance, but must instead be charged with
agreeing, consenting, offering, or negotiating to
distribute a controlled substance as specifically
provided in § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv). State v. Scott,
732 P.2d 117 (Utah 1987).
Whenever culpable conduct arises under the
Controlled Substance Act and is specifically
defined by it, trial courts must reject instructions to the jury under more general provisions
outside the act. State v. Scott, 732 P.2d 117
(Utah 1987).

l]nder statute subsequently amended.
Law in effect at time of sentencing, not law in
~£feet at time of incarceration, governed sentence to be served; defendant who was convicted and sentenced for forgery before amendment of applicable statute to provide a lesser
penalty but who was not incarcerated until
after the amendment was not entitled to be
resentenced under the amended statute; sentencing under old statute was not a denial of
equal protection. Harris v. Smith, 541 P.2d 343
(Utah 1975).

Sentencing.
-After effective date of Code.
Nonstatutory law existing at the time of
commissionof crime included decisions holding

COLLATERALREFERENCES

Am.Jur. 2d.- 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 7.

C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 25.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law ¢,,, 1206.

76-1-104. Purposes and principles of construction.
The provisions of this code shall be construed in accordance with these
general purposes.
(1) Forbid and prevent the commission of offenses.
(2) Define adequately the conduct and mental state which constitute
each offense and safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal.
(3) Prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of
offenses and which permit recognition or differences in rehabilitation
possibilities among individual offenders.
(4) Prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons accused or
convicted of offenses.
3
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History: C. 1953, 76-1-104, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-104.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Determining whether the penalty is proportionate to the crime requires a careful and
thoughtful consideration of the individual defendant and the circumstances surrounding his
crime. Focus on the individual defendant and
his acts is called for in this section, not comparison with other criminals and their crimes.
State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988, 110 S. Ct. 1837, 108
L. Ed. 2d 965 (1990).

Proportionate penalties.
A case-by-case (comparative) proportionality
review was not required in response to defendant's contention that his sentence of death
was disproportionate to the crime committed,
the immunity granted his accomplice, and the
sentences meted out in other first-degree murder cases. State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah
1987), cert. denied, Tillman v. Cook,
U.S.
, 114 S. Ct. 706, 126 L. Ed. 2d 671 (1994).

COLLATERALREFERENCES
C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law§ 25.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law e.o 13.

Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§§ 9, 18.

76-1-105.

Common law crimes abolished.

Common law crimes are abolished and no conduct is a crime unless made so
by this code, other applicable statute or ordinance.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-105, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-105; 1974, ch. 32, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
punishment and clearly covering the conduct.
Ogden City v. McLaughlin, 5 Utah 387, 16 P.
721 (1888).
Since common-law crimes were abolished
and court could not impose penalties unless the
penalties were authorized by statute or ordinance, statute or ordinance that failed to attach
penalty to crime or offenses was inoperative.
Roe v. Lundstrom, 89 Utah 520, 57 P.2d 1128
(1936).

ANALYSIS

Common law crimes abolished.
Necessity for statute or ordinance.
Cited.
Common law crimes abolished.
The Criminal Code explicitly abolishes all
common law crimes. State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d
903 (Utah 1982).
Necessity for statute or ordinance.
Conduct, no matter how reprehensible, was
not punishable in absence of a law authorizing

Cited in State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568
(Utah 1991).

COLLATERALREFERENCES
C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 24.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law e.o 11.

Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 7.

76-1-106.

Strict construction

rule not applicable.

The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed shall not apply to this
code, any of its provisions, or any offense defined by the laws of this state. All
provisions of this code and offenses defined by the laws of this state shall be
construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and to
effect the objects of the law and general purposes of Section 76-1-104.
4
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76-1-107

§§ 68-2-8, 68-2-9, 68-3-5.
Statutes in derogation of the common law not
strictly construed, § 68-3-2.

History: C. 1953, 76-1-106, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-106.
Cross-References. - Effect of repeal on
prosecution of offenses already committed,

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Lewis, 52 Utah 7, 172 P. 286 (1918).

ANALYSIS

Extension of time.
Notwithstanding statute providing that
criminal statutes were not to be strictly construed, it was beyond court's power to extend
statutory time for filing motion for new trial.
State v. Sawyer, 54 Utah 75, 182 P. 206 (1919).

City ordinances.
Extension of time.
Cited.
City ordinances.
Statute providing that criminal statutes
were not to be strictly construed applied to city
ordinances, and ordinance prohibiting sale of
intoxicating liquors was given liberal construction so as to uphold its validity. Salina City v.

Cited in State v. Jones, 735 P.2d 399 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987); State v. Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.-21Am.
§§ 10, 18.

76-1-107.

C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 25.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law e=> 12.

Jur. 2d Criminal Law

Procedure -Applicable
provisions - Military
codes, enforcement of court orders, and liability
for civil damages not affected.

(1) Except as otherwise provided, the procedure governing the accusation,
prosecution, conviction, and punishment of offenders and offenses is not
regulated by this act but by the code of criminal procedure.
(2) This code does not affect any power conferred by law upon any courtmartial or other military authority or officer to impose and inflict punishment
upon offenders violating military codes or laws; nor does it affect any power of
a court to punish for contempt or to employ any sanction authorized by law for
the enforcement of an order or a civil judgment or decree.
(3) This act does not bar, suspend, or otherwise affect any right or liability
to damages, penalty, forfeiture, impeachment, or other remedy authorized by
law to be recovered or enforced in a civil action, administrative proceeding, or
otherwise, regardless of whether the conduct involved in the proceeding
constitutes an offense defined in this code.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-107, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-107.
Cross-References. - Civil and criminal
remedies do not merge,§ 68-3-4.

Contempt generally, § 78-32-1 et seq.
Criminal procedure, Title 77.
Military court, § 39-6-16.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Contempt proceeding.
Former Penal Code provision similar to Subsection (2) of this section expressed no distinction between a contempt proceeding in the

nature of a civil proceeding and one in the
nature of a criminal proceeding. Foreman v.
Foreman, 111 Utah 113, 176 P.2d 165 (1947).
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Separability

clause.

If any provision of this act, or the application of any provision to any person
or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this act shall not be affected
thereby.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-108, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-108.
Meaning of "this act." - Laws 1973, ch.

196 enacted Title 76, to which new provisions
have since been added.

PART2
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
76-1-201.

Jurisdiction

of offenses.

(1) A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an offense which he
commits, while either within or outside the state, by his own conduct or that of
another for which he is legally accountable, if:
(a) The offense is committed either wholly or partly within the state; or
(b) The conduct outside the state constitutes an attempt to commit an
offense within the state; or
(c) The conduct outside the state constitutes a conspiracy to commit an
offense within the state and an act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs
in the state; or
(d) The conduct within the state constitutes an attempt, solicitation, or
conspiracy to commit in another jurisdiction an offense under the laws of
both this state and such other jurisdiction.
(2) An offense is committed partly within this state if either the conduct
which is an element of the offense, or the result which is such an element,
occurs within this state. In homicide the "result" is either the physical contact
which causes death, or the death itself; and if the body of a homicide victim is
found within the state, the death shall be presumed to have occurred within
the state.
(3) An offense which is based on an omission to perform a duty imposed by
the law of this state is committed within the state regardless of the location of
the offender at the time of the omission.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-201, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-201.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
committed outside reservation, 858 P.2d 926
(1992).
Offense committed on Uintah-Ouray Indian
reservation was not in Indian country for purposes of criminal jurisdiction, because congressional acts had diminished the original reservation boundaries and subsequent homesteading and settlement occurred on lands restored to the public domain; defendant's criminal conduct formed the basis of state court
jurisdiction, regardless of defendant's personal
Indian status. State v. Coando, 858 P.2d 926

ANALYSIS

Indians.
Theft out of state.

Indians.
As drawee bank's refusal of payment occurred in land under state jurisdiction, the
state had proper jurisdiction to prosecute Indian defendant for all bad checks written on the
bank. State v. Coando, 784 P.2d 1228 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989), aff'd on ground that offense was

6
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76-1-202

on a charge of grand larceny after defendants
stole car in Texas and drove it to Utah. Conners
v. Turner, 29 Utah 2d 311, 508 P.2d 1185 (1973).

(Utah 1992); State v. Hagen, 858 P.2d 925
(Utah 1992); Roosevelt City v. Gardner, 858
P.2d 1004 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

Theft out of state.
Utah court had jurisdiction to try defendants
COLLATERALREFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law

Utah Law Review. -A Conceptual Framework for Extradition and Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crimes, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 685.
Brigham Young Law Review. - State v.
Perank: Is the Uintah-Ouray Reservation
"Nailed Down Upon the Border"?, 1992 B.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1247.

§ 336 et seq.

C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 154.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law ¢:> 84(2),
114.

76-1-202. Venue of actions.
(1) Criminal actions shall be tried in the county, district, or precinct where
the offense is alleged to have been committed. In determining the proper place
of trial, the following provisions shall apply:
(a) If the commission of an offense commenced outside the state is
consummated within this state, the offender shall be tried in the county
where the offense is consummated.
(b) When conduct constituting elements of an offense or results that
constitute elements, whether the conduct or result constituting elements
is in itself unlawful, shall occur in two or more counties, trial of the offense
may be held in any of the counties concerned.
(c) If a person committing an offense upon the person of another is
located in one county and his victim is located in another county at the
time of the commission of the offense, trial may be held in either county.
(d) If a cause of death is inflicted in one county and death ensues in
another county, the offender may be tried in either county.
(e) A person who commits an inchoate offense may be tried in any
county in which any act that is an element of the offense, including the
agreement in conspiracy, is committed.
(f) Where a person in one county solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or
attempts to aid another in the planning or commission of an offense in
another county, he may be tried for the offense in either county.
(g) When an offense is committed within this state and it cannot be
readily determined in which county or district the offense occurred, the
following provisions shall be applicable:
(i) When an offense is committed upon any railroad car, vehicle,
watercraft, or aircraft passing within this state, the offender may be
tried in any county through which such railroad car, vehicle, watercraft, or aircraft has passed.
(ii) When an offense is committed on any body of water bordering
on or within this state, the offender may be tried in any county
adjacent to such body of water. The words "body of water" shall
include but not be limited to any stream, river, lake, or reservoir,
whether natural or man-made.
(iii) A person who commits theft may be tried in any county in
which he exerts control over the property affected.
7
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(iv) If an offense is committed on or near the bou11dary of two or
more counties, trial of the offense may be held in any of such counties.
(v) For any other offense, trial may be held in the county in which
the defendant resides, or, ifhe has no fixed residence, in the county in
which he is apprehended or to which he is extradited.
(2) All objections of improper place of trial are waived by a defendant unless
made before trial.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-202, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-202; 1994, ch. 218, § 3.
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amend-

ment, effective May 2, 1994, inserted "or precinct" in the introductory language of Subsection (1).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
v. Mitchell, 3 Utah 2d 70, 278 P.2d 618 (1955).

ANALYSIS

Specific intent crime.
When an offense requires the formation of a
specific intent to commit it, the formation of
such an intent is an element of the crime, and
venue is properly laid in the county where the
intent was formed, notwithstanding that all
other elements of the crime were accomplished
elsewhere. State v. Cauble, 563 P.2d 775 (Utah
1977).

Proof of venue.
Specific intent crime.
Waiver of objection.
Proof of venue.
In absence of objection or motion to strike, or
any specific dispute as to location, a statement
of a witness that he was under "the impression"
that a certain place was "in Salt Lake County"
was sufficient to make prima facie proof of
venue. State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750
(1936).
Venue is not an element of the offense of
murder, so it was sufficient that proof of venue
was by a preponderance of the evidence. State

Waiver of objection.
Defendant waived his objection to venue
when he did not make any objection to venue
before, or even during, trial. State v. Dunbar,
665 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1983).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 361 et seq.
C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law§ 177.
A.L.R.- Venue in criminal case where crime
is committed partly in one county and partly in
\,,, I

another, 73A.L.R.3d 907; 100A.L.R.3d 1174; 11
A.L.R.4th 704.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law <,;::.>106 et
seq.

PARTS

LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS
76-1-301.

Capital felony, aggravated murder, murder,
manslaughter - Embezzlement of public moneys - Falsification of public records.

A prosecution for a capital felony, aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, embezzlement of public moneys, or the falsification of public records may
be commenced at any time.
ment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted "aggravated murder, murder" for ''murder in the
first or second degree."

History: C. 1953, 76-1-301, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-301; 1985 (1st S.S.), ch.
2, § 1; 1991, ch. 10, § 4.
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amend-
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76-1-303

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

A.L.R. - Issuance or service of state-court
arrest warrant, summons, citation, or other

76-1-302.

process as tolling criminal statute of limitations, 71 A.L.R.4th 554.

Time limitations for prosecution
Commencement of prosecution.

of offenses -

(1) Except as otherwise provided, a prosecution for:

(a) a felony or negligent homicide shall be commenced within four years
after it is committed;
(b) a misdemeanor other than negligent homicide shall be commenced
within two years after it is committed; and
(c) any infraction shall be commenced within one year after it is
committed.
(2) A prosecution is commenced upon the finding and filing of an indictment
by a grand jury or upon the filing of a complaint or information.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-302, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-302; 1985 (1st S.S.), ch.
2, § 2; 1990, ch. 5, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
unless otherwise clearly provided. Thus, where
the crimes of securities fraud were defined in
the more specific Utah Uniform Securities Act,
which includes its own limitations period, that
five-year limitations period controls. State v.
Moore, 802 P.2d 732 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

Burden of proof.
"Otherwise provided."
Running of statute.
Cited.

Burden of proof.
The state bears the burden of proving that a
criminal action is not barred by the statute of
limitations, whenever that issue is properly
raised. State v. Pierce, 782 P.2d 194 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).

Running of statute.
The fact that the person was a convict serving out his term of imprisonment did not stop
the running of the statute. People v. Flynn, 7
Utah 378, 26 P. 1114 (1891).

"Otherwise provided."
A statute of limitations included in the same
act that defines a crime applies to that crime

Cited in State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281 (Utah
1985); State v. Pierce, 782 P.2d 194 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Brigham Young Law Review. - Pleading
the Statute of Limitations in Criminal Cases,
1977B.Y.U.L. Rev. 75.
Am.Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. J ur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 223.

C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 196.
A.L.R. - Waivability of bar of limitations
against criminal prosecution, 78 A.L.R.4th 693.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law e=> 145½ et
seq.

76-1-303. Fraud or breach of fiduciary obligation - Misconduct of public officer or employee - Sexual
offense against a child.
If the period prescribed in Subsection 76-1-302(1) has expired, a prosecution
may nevertheless be commenced for:
9
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(1) any offense a material element of which is either fraud or a breach
of fiduciary obligation within one year after discovery of the offense by an
aggrieved party or by a person who has a legal duty to represent an
aggrieved party and who is himself not a party to the offense, but in no
case shall this provision extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more than three years;
(2) any offense based upon misconduct in office by a public officer or
employee at any time during the term of defendant's public office or the
period of his public employment or within two years thereafter, but in no
case shall this provision extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more than three years; and
(3) rape of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual
abuse of a child within four years after the report of the offense to a law
enforcement agency.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-303, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-303; 1983, ch. 88, § 1;
1991,ch. 175,§ 2;1993,ch.4,§
123.
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted the
present numerical subsection designations for
the former letter designations and substituted
all the present language of Subsection (3) after

"within" for "one year after the report of the
offense to law enforcement officials, so long as
no more than eight years has elapsed since the
alleged commission of the offense."
The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993,
substituted a semicolon and "and" for a period
at the end of Subsection (2) and made a stylistic
change.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
tations established therein to apply only to the
newly designated offenses and not to the standard, generic crimes of rape and sodomy which
provided a basis for prosecution prior to 1983 in
cases in which the victims were children. State
v. Lavoto, 776 P.2d 912 (Utah 1989).
Cited in State v. Pierce, 782 P.2d 194 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989).

ANALYSIS

Applicability.
Cited.
Applicability.
In using the exact names of the crimes in
Subsection (3), which was added in 1983, the
legislature intended the specific statute oflimi-

COLLATERALREFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Child Sexual Abuse
Cases, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 443.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 224.

76-1-304.

A.L.R. - Waivability of bar of limitations
against criminal prosecution, 78AL.R.4th 693.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law e= 154.

Defendant out of state.

The period of limitation does not run against any defendant during any
period of time he is out of the state following the commission of an offense.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-304, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-304.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447 (Utah
1987).
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76-1-401

COLLATERALREFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. -21Am.
§ 227.

C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 203.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law .g:::, 152.

Jur. 2d Criminal Law

76-1-305. Lesser included offense
limitations has run.

for which

period

of

Whenever a defendant is charged with an offense for which the period of
limitations has not run and the defendant should be found guilty of a lesser
offense for which the period oflimitations has run, the finding of the lesser and
included offense against which the statute of limitations has run shall not be
a bar to punishment for the lesser offense.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-305, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-305.
COLLATERALREFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.-

§ 225.

C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 198.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law .g:::, 145½.
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PART4
MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS AND
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
76-1-401. "Single criminal episode" defined - Joinder of
offenses and defendants.
In this part unless the context requires a different definition, "single
criminal episode" means all conduct which is closely related in time and is
incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective.
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or modify the effect of Section
77-21-31 in controlling the joinder of offenses and defendants in criminal
proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-401, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-401; 1975, ch. 47, § 1.
Compiler's Notes. - Section 77-21-31,

cited in this section, was repealed in 1980. For
the present comparable provision, see Rule 9,
R. Crim. P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Separate episodes.

ANALYSIS

Separate episodes.
-Criminal objectives.
-Property pawned separately.
Separate offenses.
Single episode.
Trafficoffenses.
Cited.

-Criminal objectives.
Where defendant committed a robbery in one
county, and later, in another county some 65
miles away, picked up two hitchhikers and
decided to kidnap them as hostages, the difference in time, location, and the criminal objectives of robbery and kidnapping rendered the
conduct separate crimes rather than one single
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criminal episode. State v. Ireland, 570 P.2d
1206 (Utah 1977).
The unlawful taking of a vehicle and the
failure to stop at the command of a police officer
were two separate offenses, and not a single
episode, because the two offenses occurred a
day apart and the criminal objective in the
unlawful taking was to obtain possession while
the criminal objective in the failure to stop was
to avoid arrest for a traffic violation. State v.
Cornish, 571 P.2d 577 (Utah 1977).

-Property pawned separately.
Receipt of property stolen, received, and
pawned on three different days did not arise
out of a single criminal episode. State v. Tarafa,
720 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1986).

viduals is a single act and a single offense if
evidence shows that the items were retained
simultaneously. Therefore, where stolen items
were the subject of a previous prosecution for
related offenses, a second prosecution was precluded. State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203 (Utah 1983).

Traffic offenses.
This section does not prevent the prosecution
of a drunk driving charge under§ 41-6-44 after
the defendant has pleaded guilty to driving
without a license, without a registration certificate and without a safety sticker, since the
citations charge separate offenses entirely unrelated to each other. Hupp v. Johnson, 606 P.2d
253 (Utah 1980).
Cited in State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896 (Utah
1986); State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987); State v. McGrath, 749 P.2d 631
(Utah 1988); State v. Thompson, 751 P.2d 805
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); State v. Ortega, 751 P.2d
1138 (Utah 1988); State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d
1135 (Utah 1989); State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).

Separate offenses.
Although defendant's crimes were committed
during a single criminal episode, he committed
two separate burglaries by breaking into two
separate, locked portions of an apartment
building. State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174 (Utah
1985).
Single episode.
Retention of stolen property of different indi-

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
§

Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
20.

76-1-402.

C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law§ 14.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law Q;:.> 29.

Separate offenses arising out of single criminal
episode - Included offenses.

(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the
same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under
any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single
criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a
defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and
{b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included
offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or
{b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included
therein; or
12
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(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense,
the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-402, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-402; 1974, ch. 32, § 2.
Cross-References. - Computer Crimes Act
not to bar prosecution for conduct also violating

another statute, § 76-6-704.
Double jeopardy prohibited for same offense,
Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 12; U.S. Const.,
Amend. V; § 77-1-6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

"Act."
Instructions.
Jurisdiction of appellate court.
-Judgment entered for included offense.
Jurisdiction of a single court.
Lesser included offense.
-Aggravated assault.
-Aggravated robbery.
-Joy riding.
-Manslaughter.
-Negligent homicide.
-Possession of stolen vehicle.
-Theft..
Misdemeanor and felony charges.
Multiple predicate offenses.
Separate offenses.
-Attempted homicide.
-Automobile violations.
- Burglary and larceny.
- Burglary and theft.
- Felony murder.
- Forcible sexual abuse.
-Negligent homicide.
-Theft..
Cited.

"Act."

"Act"as used in Subsection (1) includes not
onlyvolitional acts of a defendant, but also the
number of victims, as each is acted upon by a
defendant. State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989); State v. Gambrell, 814 P.2d 1136
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Instructions.
Where the greater offense includes all the
elements of the lesser offense, an instruction on
the lesser offense may be refused if the pros-

ecution has met its burden of proof on the
elements of the greater offense and there is no
evidence tending to reduce the greater offense;
however, if there be any evidence, however
slight, on any reasonable theory of the case
under which defendant might be convicted of
the lesser included offense, the trial court must,
if requested, give an appropriate instruction on
the lesser included offense. State v. Chesnut,
621 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980).
Trial court may give a lesser included offense
instruction, even over a defendant's objection, if
warranted by the evidence and if there is
clearly no risk that the defendant will be prejudiced by lack of notice and preparation so as to
deprive him of a full and fair opportunity to
defend himself. State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91
(Utah 1982).
Although lesser offense must be necessarily
included within charged offense in order to
warrant prosecutor's request for lesser included offense instructions, a "rational basis"
test is all that is required when instruction is at
request of defense. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152
(Utah 1983).
In a burglary case, it was not prejudicial
error for a trial court to refuse to give instructions on criminal trespass as a lesser included
offense, when the evidence supported only the
burglary charge. State v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 215
(Utah 1983).
Defendants in a prosecution for second degree murder, who maintained that they did not
cause the victim's death, were not entitled to a
lesser included offense instruction on manslaughter since their defense would also have
required acquittal of manslaughter. State v.
Crick, 675 P.2d 527 (Utah 1983).
A lesser included offense shares not only
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common facts with the greater offense; the two
offenses must also be related by overlapping
statutory elements. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152
(Utah 1983).
Trial court must give a lesser included offense instruction when requested by defendant
if evidence is ambiguous and susceptible to
alternative interpretations, any one of which
provides both a rational basis for a verdict
acquitting defendant of charged greater offense
and convicting him of lesser included offense;
however, when prosecution seeks an instruction on a lesser included offense, both legal
elements and actual evidence or inferences
needed to demonstrate those elements must
necessarily be included within original charged
offense to justify instruction. State v. Baker,
671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983); State v. Oldroyd, 685
P.2d 551 (Utah 1984).
State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983),
requires that when a defendant requests an
instruction on a lesser included offense, it must
be given if (i) the statutory elements of greater
and lesser included offenses overlap to some
degree, and (ii) the evidence provides a "rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant
of the offense charged and convicting him of the
included offense;" these requirements should be
liberally construed. State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d
421 (Utah 1986).
Assault is a lesser included offense of forcible
sexual abuse, and when the evidence provided
a rational basis to acquit on the charge of
forcible sexual abuse while simultaneously providing a rational basis to convict on the charge
of assault, the trial court was required to instruct on the lesser included offense. State v.
Jones, 243 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah Ct. App.
1994).
The rational basis standard of Subsection (4)
does not require the court to weigh the credibility of the evidence with respect to included
offenses. The court must decide only whether
there is a quantum of evidence presented to
justify sending the question to the jury. State v.
Peterson, 248 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (Utah Ct. App.
1994).

Jurisdiction of appellate court.
-Judgment entered for included offense.
Where there was insufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for second degree
murder, but there was sufficient evidence to
support a conviction for the included offense of
manslaughter, Supreme Court, pursuant to
this section, vacated and set aside the conviction of second degree murder on appeal and
entered a judgment of conviction for the included offense of manslaughter. State v.
Bindrup, 655 P.2d 674 (Utah 1982).
Evidence of depraved indifference to the risk
of death was insufficient to support defendant's

conviction of second degree murder, but there
was sufficient evidence of recklessness to support a conviction of the included offense of
manslaughter; the Supreme Court, pursuant to
Subsection (5), remanded the case to the trial
court with directions to set aside the verdict
and to enter a judgment of conviction for manslaughter. State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214
(Utah 1985).

Jurisdiction of a single court.
Plea of guilty to two charges in justice of the
peace court did not bar a subsequent prosecution in the district court for another offense
arising from the same criminal episode that
was not within the jurisdiction of the justice of
the peace court. State v. Cooley, 575 P.2d 693
(Utah 1978).
Lesser included offense.
-Aggravated assault.
Trial court properly refused to instruct the
jury on the offense of aggravated assault at
defendant's trial for second-degree murder
where the evidence would not support both an
acquittal on the murder charge and a conviction on the aggravated assault charge. State v.
Velarde, 734 P.2d 440 (Utah 1986); compare
State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449 (Utah 1986),
where issue of intent permitted instruction on
aggravated assault.
Refusal to give defendant's requested instruction on aggravated assault at his trial for
second-degree murder was reversible error because the jury needed to determine whether the
defendant lacked the intent to cause death or
serious bodily injury, which would permit an
acquittal on the murder charge while allowing
a conviction on the aggravated assault charge.
State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449 (Utah 1986).
Aggravated assault was a lesser and included
offense of aggravated burglary, because the jury
was not required to find any additional elements to convict defendant of aggravated assault once it had found him guilty of aggravated
burglary. State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874 (Utah
1988).
-Aggravated robbery.
Under the test for separateness in Subsection
(3), aggravated robbery becomes a lesser included offense of first degree felony murder
when the predicate felony for first degree murder is aggravated robbery. State v. Shaffer, 725
P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986).
-Joy riding.
Joy riding (former§ 41-1-109; now see § 41la-1311) is a lesser and included offense of theft
of a motor vehicle(§ 76-6-404). State v. Lloyd,
568 P.2d 357 (Utah 1977); State v. Cornish, 568
P.2d 360 (Utah 1977).
When a defendant was improperly convicted
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of possession of a stolen vehicle, but the facts
did not support a conviction for joy riding
because the vehicle was not returned to the
owner within 24 hours owing to the defendant's
arrest, a conviction of joy riding as a lesser
included offense was not appropriate. State v.
Basford, 799 P.2d 228 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

-Manslaughter.
Absent any evidence that manslaughter
would not be an included offense in his particular case, defendant who was charged with murder but pleaded guilty to the lesser included
offense of manslaughter could not later seek
reversal on the theory that manslaughter is not
always an included offense of a second-degree
murder charge. Farrow v. Smith, 541 P.2d 1107
(Utah 1975).
-Negligent homicide.
Negligent homicide is an included offense
under a charge of manslaughter. State v. Dyer,
671 P.2d 142 (Utah 1983).
-Possession of stolen vehicle.
Possession of a stolen vehicle was a lesser
included offense of theft of a vehicle, where the
record did not indicate that the defendant ever
relinquished his claim of ownership or passed
title to the vehicle during the time it had been
left at his brother-in-law's house while defendant was serving a prison sentence. State v.
Larocco,794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990).

76-1-402

and a misdemeanor. State v. Carmen, 44 Utah
353, 140 P. 670 (1914).
This section did not prevent trial and conviction of defendant in city court on misdemeanor
charge of carrying loaded firearm in vehicle,
and subsequent trial and conviction in district
court on felony charge of possession of firearm
by a convicted person, both charges being based
on defendant's one act of firing rifle from his
van. State v. Sosa, 598 P.2d 342 (Utah 1979).

Multiple predicate offenses.
Where defendant was convicted of first degree murder, aggravated sexual assault, and
aggravated kidnapping and the latter two offenses were found to be predicate offenses of the
capital murder charge, the kidnapping conviction did not merge with the murder conviction
because it was not closely related causally to
the killing, but the sexual assault conviction
merged into the homicide because it was proved
by the same facts that proved the capital murder conviction. State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70 (Utah
1993).

-Theft.
Theft is a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery, and therefore a defendant cannot be convicted of both crimes. State v. Hill,
674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983).
When the same criminal act of taking personal property is necessary to theft and aggravated robbery charges, theft is a lesser included
offenseof aggravated robbery. State v. Shaffer,
725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986).
Defendant was not entitled to an instruction
on theft at his trial for burglary, because there
was no evidence to provide a rational basis for
acquitting him of burglary and convicting him
oftheft. State v. Pitts, 728 P.2d 113 (Utah 1986).
Theft was a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery, where the evidence showed a
completed robbery and the crime of theft as
part of that same criminal episode. State v.
Branch, 743 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1036, 108 S. Ct. 1597, 99 L. Ed.
2d 911 (1988).

Separate offenses.
Prosecution for an "act or omission" made
punishable by more than one statute did not
bar a second prosecution unless the acts or
omissions charged were, as a whole, the same;
fact that some of the acts or omissions charged
in the first prosecution were also elements of
the second offense was irrelevant. State v.
Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 157 P.2d 258 (1945).
This section did not preclude prosecution and
conviction for both robbery and kidnaping of a
defendant who robbed a station and then took
an employee into an adjacent room and tied
him up. State v. Eichler, 584 P.2d 861 (Utah
1978).
Defendant's holding five persons hostage constituted five separate offenses of kidnaping
arising out of a single criminal episode. Double
jeopardy protections did not prohibit defendant
from being convicted of five counts of kidnaping. State v. James, 631 P.2d 854 (Utah 1981).
Although defendant's crimes were committed
during a single criminal episode, he committed
two separate burglaries by breaking into two
separate, locked portions of an apartment
building. State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174 (Utah
1985).
Defendant's separate acts requiring proof of
different elements supported conviction on
three counts of forcible sexual abuse. See State
v. Suarez, 736 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1987).

Misdemeanor and felony charges.
Former§ 76-1-23, which was similar to Subsection(1) of this section, could not be invoked
to produce incongruous as well as inequitable
results; it could not be considered as intended
to authorize enforcement of two criminal statutes, making the same offense both a felony

-Attempted homicide.
Attempted homicide and aggravated assault
were not lesser included offenses of either a
capital homicide charge or defendant's seconddegree murder conviction, where defendant's
crimes required proof by different evidence and
there was more than one victim. State v. Mane,
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783 P.2d 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

-Automobile violations.
Reckless driving or speeding conviction
would not bar subsequent prosecution for involuntary manslaughter arising out of same occurrence. State v. Empey, 65 Utah 609, 239 P. 25,
44 A.L.R. 558 (1925); State v. Thatcher, 108
Utah 63, 157 P.2d 258 (1945).
-Burglary and larceny.
Where the facts in a criminal prosecution
showed a breaking and entering and a larceny,
the entering did not include and was independent of the larceny; each offense required different acts and former § 76-1-23 did not preclude conviction on both burglary and larceny
charges. State v. Jones, 13 Utah 2d 35, 368 P.2d
262 (1962).
-Burglary and theft.
While there is some overlap in the offenses of
burglary and theft, as each requires the intent
of depriving another of property, burglary does
not involve unauthorized control over that
property. Therefore, burglary may be committed without having committed theft. Since a
conviction for burglary does not exclude a conviction for theft, a person could constitutionally
be convicted of both offenses. Duran v. Cook,
788 P.2d 1038 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
-Felony murder.
The Legislature did not intend the multiple
crimes of felony murder to be punished as a
single crime, but rather that the homicide be
enhanced to second-degree felony murder in
addition to the underlying felony. Allowing punishment for both felony murder and the underlying felony violates neither the double jeopardy principles of the fifth amendment to the

U.S. Constitution, Art. I, § 12 of the Utah
Constitution, nor Subsection (3) of this section.
State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1990).

-Forcible sexual abuse.
Forcible sexual abuse was not a lesser included offense of forcible sodomy, because neither of the acts on which the forcible sexual
abuse counts were based satisfied the elements
of forcible sodomy. State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233
(Utah 1989).
-Negligent homicide.
Trial judge did not err in refusing to instruct
the jury on negligent homicide at defendant's
trial for second-degree murder, because the
evidence showing his participation in a fatal
beating was not ambiguous or susceptible to
alternative interpretations which would have
made it possible for the jury to acquit him of
second-degree murder and convict him of negligent homicide. State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449
(Utah 1986).
-Theft.
A conviction for theft did not merge with a
conviction for first degree murder because evidence at trial was sufficient to prove the crime
of murder in the first degree without relying on
the theft conviction as the aggravating circumstance required for the murder conviction.
State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993).
Cited in State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896 (Utah
1986); State v. Haga, 735 P.2d 44 (Utah 1987);
State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Utah 1988); State
v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203 (1989); State v. Jaimez,
817 P.2d 822 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v.
Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991); State v.
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Recent Developments
in Utah Law - Judicial Decisions - Criminal
Law, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 137.
Recent Developments in Utah Law - Judicial Decisions - Criminal Law, 1988 Utah L.
Rev. 177.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 20.
C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 14.
A.L.R. - Seizure or detention for purpose of
committing rape, robbery, or similar offense as
constituting separate crime of kidnaping, 43
A.L.R.3d 699.

16

Lesser-related state offense instructions:
modern status, 50 A.L.R.4th 1081.
Various acts of weapons violations as separate or continuing offense, 80 A.L.R.4th 631.
Propriety oflesser-included-offense charge to
jury in federal prosecution for crime involving
property rights, 105 A.L.R. Fed. 669.
Propriety oflesser-included-offense charge in
federal prosecution of narcotics defendant, 106
A.L.R. Fed. 236.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law ®-> 29.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent
ecution for offense out of same episode.

76-1-403

pros-

(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out
of a single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a
different offense arising out of the same criminal episode is barred if:
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should have
been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; and
(b) The former prosecution:
(i) resulted in acquittal; or
(ii) resulted in conviction; or
(iii) was improperly terminated; or
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment for the defendant
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that necessarily
required a determination inconsistent with a fact that must be
established to secure conviction in the subsequent prosecution.
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not guilty
by the trier of facts or in a determination that there was insufficient evidence
to warrant conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an
acquittal of the greater offense even though the conviction for the lesser
included offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated.
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of guilt
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not
been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a
judgment; or a plea of guilty accepted by the court.
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the termination takes
place before the verdict, is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and takes
place after a jury has been impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the
jury trial is waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, termination of
prosecution is not improper if:
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the termination;
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the termination is
necessary because:
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity
with the law; or
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not attributable to the
state that would make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law; or
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not attributable
to the state makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without
injustice to the defendant or the state; or
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-403, enacted by L.
1973,ch. 196, § 76-1-403; 1974, ch. 32, § 3.
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was not the equivalent of consenting to termination of trial, which would have allowed the
state to retry defendant on the same charges.
State v. Nilson, 854 P.2d 1029 (Utah Ct. App.
1993).

ANALYSIS

Acquittal.
Conduct constituting single crime.
Consent to termination.
Factors.
Severed counts.
Cited.

Factors.
Both the sequence of events leading to a trial
termination, and the equivocation or ambiguity
of a defendant's response, are important factors
to consider in determining whether reprosecution is permissible. State v. Nilson, 854 P.2d
1029 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

Acquittal
Trial court's ruling at the end of the state's
case that "the state failed to present sufficient
evidence to make out a prima facie case on any
of the remaining counts of the information"and
dismissal with prejudice was an acquittal and
not a dismissal. State v. Jackson, 857 P.2d 267
(Utah Ct. App. 1993).

Severed counts.
This section does not mandate dismissal if
counts were properly severed. Thus, where a
magistrate severed counts "to promote justice"
and the district court later refused to rejoin
them for the same reason after defendant had
been convicted on one of the counts, the case
was not one that "should have been tried under
§ 76-1-402." State v. Haga, 735 P.2d 44 (Utah
1987).

Conduct constituting single crime.
Retention of stolen property of different individuals is a single act and a single offense when
evidence shows that the items were retained
simultaneously. Therefore, where stolen items
were the subject of a previous prosecution for
related offenses, a second prosecution was precluded. State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203 (Utah 1983).

Cited in State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34 (Utah
1987); State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028 (Utah
1991).

Consent to termination.
Lack of objection to state's motion to dismiss

COLLATERALREFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 243 et seq.
C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 208.
A.L.R. - Prosecution for robbery of one
person as bar to subsequent prosecution for
robbery of another person committed at the

76-1-404.

same time, 51 A.L.R.3d 693.
Determination that state failed to prove
charges relied upon for revocation of probation
as barring subsequent criminal action based on
same underlying charges, 2 A.L.R.5th 262.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law cS:::;o161.

Concurrent jurisdiction - Prosecution in other
jurisdiction barring prosecution in state.

If a defendant's conduct establishes the commission of one or more offenses
within the concurrent jurisdiction of this state and of another jurisdiction,
federal or state, the prosecution in the other jurisdiction is a bar to a
subsequent prosecution in this state if(l) the former prosecution resulted in an
acquittal, conviction, or termination of prosecution, as those terms are defined
in Section 76-1-403, and (2) the subsequent prosecution is for the same offense
or offenses.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-404, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-404.
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of murder after his conviction in federal court
for violating the civil rights of the two murder
victims did not violate the prohibition against
double jeopardy. State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34
(Utah 1987).

ANALYSIS

Murder.
-Violation of victims' civil rights.
Cited.

Murder.

-Violation

Cited in State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah
1990).

of victims' civil rights.

Defendant's trial in state court on two counts

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
UtahLawReview.-RecentDevelopments
in Utah Law-Judicial
Decisions - Criminal

76-1-405. Subsequent
stances.

Law, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 177.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Lawe=> 97.

prosecution

not barred - Circum-

A subsequent prosecution for an offense shall not be barred under the
followingcircumstances:
(1) The former prosecution was procured by the defendant without the
knowledge of the prosecuting attorney bringing the subsequent prosecution and with intent to avoid the sentence that might otherwise be
imposed; or
(2) The former prosecution resulted in· a judgment of guilt held invalid
in a subsequent proceeding on writ of habeas corpus, coram nobis, or
similar collateral attack.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-405, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-405.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am.Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§§ 256, 257.

Key Numbers. - Criminal Law e=>165.

PARTS
BURDEN OF PROOF
76-1-501. Presumption of innocence
offense" defined.

-

"Element of the

(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until
eachelement of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense;
(b) The culpable mental state required.
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements of the offense
but shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence.
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History: C. 1953, 76-1-501, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-501.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Jones v. Shulsen, 717 P.2d 1336
(Utah 1986); State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466

(Utah Ct. App. 1988); State v. James, 819 P.2d
781 (Utah 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Child Sexual Abuse
Cases, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 443.
Note, State v. Johnson and Multiple Factual
Theories: A Practitioner's Guide to Interpreting
Utah's "Patchwork Verdict" Rules, 1993 Utah L.
Rev. 907.

76-1-502.

Am. Jur. 2d. -

§ 236.

29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence

C.J.S. - 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 682,
697.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law <&=>308,
326.

Negating defense by allegation or proof-When
not required.

Section 76-1-501 does not require negating a defense:
(1) By allegation in an information, indictment, or other charge; or
(2) By proof, unless:
(a) The defense is in issue in the case as a result of evidence
presented at trial, either by the prosecution or the defense; or
(b) The defense is an affirmative defense, and the defendant has
presented evidence of such affirmative defense.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-502, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-502.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. - 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 682.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law <&=>326.

76-1-503.

Presumption

of fact.

An evidentiary presumption established by this code or other penal statute
has the following consequences:
(1) When evidence of facts which support the presumption exist, the
issue of the existence of the presumed fact must be submitted to the jury
unless the court is satisfied that the evidence as a whole clearly negates
the presumed fact;
(2) In submitting the issue of the existence of a presumed fact to the
jury, the court shall charge that while the presumed fact must on all
evidence be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the law regards the facts
giving rise to the presumption as evidence of the presumed fact.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-503, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-503.

Cross-References. - Presumptions in civil
proceedings, Rules of Evidence, Rule 301.
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COLLATERALREFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. -

§ 181 et seq.

C.J.S. - 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 695.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law e=-306.

29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence

76-1-504. Affirmative defense presented by defendant.
Evidence of an affirmative defense as defined by this code or other statutes
shall be presented by the defendant.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-504, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-504.
COLLATERALREFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence
§ 178.
C.J.S. - 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 689.

A.L.R. - Burden of proof as to entrapment
defense - state cases, 52 A.L.R.4th 775.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law e=-330.

PART6
DEFINITIONS
76-1-601. Definitions.
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title:
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech.
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in
a criminal action.
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of
physical condition.
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission.
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means any item capable of causing death or
serious bodily injury, or a facsimile or representation of the item, and:
(a) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the
victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or serious
bodily injury; or
(b) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other
manner that he is in control of such an item.
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state.
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act
and the actor is capable of acting.
(8) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, government, partnership, or unincorporated association.
(9) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise
dominion or control over tangible property.
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of
death.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-601, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-601; 1989, ch. 170, § 1.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
with his fist, drawing blood, caused "bodily
injury" to the victim as contemplated by the
statute. State v. Boone, 820 P.2d 930 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991).

ANALYSIS

Bodily injury.
Deadly weapon.
Facsimile of a firearm.

Bodily injury.
Defendant caused serious bodily injury such
as would create a "substantial risk of death"
when, in attempted rape, he choked victim into
unconsciousness and stabbed her with a pair of
scissors. State v. King, 604 P.2d 923 (Utah
1979).
Evidence supported finding that victim suffered sufficient bodily injury to warrant conviction for aggravated sexual abuse of a child.
State v. Mitchell, 769 P.2d 817 (Utah 1989).
Defendant who struck victim in the mouth

Deadly weapon.
Loaded gun fell within definition of "deadly
weapon" in former Subsection (10) of this section. State v. Valdez, 604 P.2d 472 (Utah 1979)
(decided before 1989 amendment replaced
"deadly or dangerous weapon" with "dangerous
weapon" in list of definitions).
Facsimile of a firearm.
Instruction defining ''facsimile of a firearm"
as "any instrument that by its appearance
resembles a firearm" was proper. State v.
Turner, 572 P.2d 387 (Utah 1977).

COLLATERALREFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes
224.
C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law§ 2.
A.L.R. - Sufficiency of bodily injury to support charge of aggravated assault, 5 A.L.R.5th
243.

Stationary object or attached fixture as
deadly or dangerous weapon for purposes of
statute aggravating offenses such as assault,
robbery, or homicide, 8 A.L.R.5th 775.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law '2= 1, 13.

§

CHAPTER2
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY
Part 1

Section
76-2-202.

Culpability Generally
Section
76-2-101.
76-2-102.
76-2-103.

76-2-104.

Requirements of criminal conduct and criminal responsibility.
Culpable mental state required
- Strict liability.
Definitions of "intentionally, or
with intent or willfully'';
"knowingly, or with knowledge"; "recklessly, or maliciously"; and "criminal negligence
or
criminally
negligent."
Conduct - When defined as offense.

Part2
Criminal Responsibility for Conduct of
Another
76-2-201.

76-2-203.
76-2-204.
76-2-205.

Parts
Defenses to Criminal Responsibility
76-2-301.
76-2-302.
76-2-303.
76-2-304.
76-2-304.5.

Definitions.
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Criminal responsibility for direct commission of offense or
for conduct of another.
Defenses unavailable in prosecution based on conduct of
another.
Criminal responsibility of corporation or association.
Criminal responsibility of person for conduct in name of
corporation or association.

Person under fourteen years old
not criminally responsible.
Compulsion.
Entrapment.
Ignorance or mistake of fact or
law.
Mistake as to victim's age not a
defense.

